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Supreme Court Recognizes Biosolids as Protected Activity under Right to Farm Act

In December of 2015, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided a landmark case, Gilbert v. Synagro Central LLC, in which it held that the land application of biosolids is a “normal agricultural operation” under the Pennsylvania Right to Farm Act (RTFA) and, as a result, bars nuisance claims from being brought in connection with the land application of biosolids.

In July of 2008, 34 individuals (“Appellees”) who owned or resided on properties adjacent to Hilltop Farm, a 220 acre farm in York County, Pennsylvania, filed a private nuisance complaint against Synagro Central LLC, a corporate entity responsible for spreading biosolids upon the farm land, George Phillips, the owner of Hilltop Farm, and Steven Troyer, a lessor of the farm’s property (“Appellants”), alleging that the application of the biosolids caused extremely noxious odors to emanate from the farm.

Arguing that the RTFA precluded a nuisance action arising from normal agricultural activities, such as the application of biosolids, Appellants relied upon Section 954(a) of the RTFA which provides, in relevant part:

 “No nuisance action shall be brought against an agricultural operation which has lawfully been in operation for one year or more prior to the date of bringing such action, where the conditions or circumstances complained of as constituting the basis for the nuisance action have existed substantially unchanged since the established date of operation and are normal agricultural operations.”

Appellees took the position that the land application of biosolids did not fall within the definition of “normal agricultural activity,” and was not protected by the RTFA. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Appellants and held the land application of biosolids met the RTFA’s definition of “normal agricultural operation,” which prompted Appellees to appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The Superior Court, however, found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the land application of biosolids was a “normal agricultural operation,” which should be resolved by a jury, and reversed the trial court’s decision.

The Supreme Court was tasked with determining two issues. The first was whether the applicability of Section 954(a) of the RTFA is a question of fact for a jury or a legal question for the court. The second was if the court was the proper arbiter, whether the land application of biosolids constitutes a “normal agricultural operation” within the meaning of RTFA.

The Supreme Court ultimately held that Section 954(a) of the RTFA is a “statute of repose,” defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as a “statute barring any suit that is brought after a specified time since the defendant acted (such as by designing or manufacturing a product), even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury.” The Court found that, typically, statutes of repose are jurisdictional and their scope is a question of law for courts to determine. The Court noted that although “there may be instances where a statute of repose’s applicability turns on resolution of factual issues” and “the jurisdictional determination will necessarily involve fact-finding,” this was not such a case.

Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the RTFA’s aim is to protect agricultural operations and that this aim “cannot be achieved by permitting the applicability of the RTFA’s statute of repose to be dependent on an idiosyncratic determination of a farming practice’s ‘normality,’ as perceived by a jury in a specific case.” As a result, the Court determined the applicability of Section 954(a) of the RTFA was a legal question for the Court.

With that determination made, the Court went on to examine statistics and facts related to the history of the land application of biosolids. It noted the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture, and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protections all hold the view that biosolids land application is a “normal agricultural application” within the meaning of 954(a) of the RTFA.

As a result, the Court concluded that the application of biosolids was a “normal agricultural operation,” the Appellee’s nuisance claim was barred by 954(a) of the RTFA and Appellants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the nuisance claim.

The Synagro holding will greatly impact agricultural operations across the Commonwealth which engage in biosolid land application, as well as entities in the business of selling biosolids for agricultural use. The Supreme Court now expressly recognizes that biosolid application constitutes a “normal agricultural operation” pursuant to the RTFA and consequently affords it protection from nuisance actions.

With that being said, agricultural operations engaging in biosolid land application should take note of Section 954(b) of the RTFA, which provides that the RTFA shall not protect agricultural operations conducted in violation of any Federal, State or local statute or governmental regulation which applies to that agricultural operation. In Synagro, Appellees failed to allege in their Amended Complaint that their injuries were the result of these violations. As a result, this issue was never examined by either the Superior or Supreme Court.

While Synagro is a legal victory for agricultural operations engaged in biosolid land application, it should not be interpreted as a license to act outside the scope of Federal and State biosolid regulatory statutes.